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Ten years on, the creating of a democratic, efficient market economy (in place of a planned economy of low
efficiency and dictatorial traits) was still claiming victims among Hungary’s citizens. Not until 2001 did personal
consumption recover to its 1989 level— on average, of course. Hungarian society in the early 1990s faced an
explosion of unemployment, a general loss of job security and inflation rates unseen for decades. State services
steadily slipped, differences of income and wealth became extreme, public security plunged, and corruption and
contempt for the law became rife.
On the other hand, there were momentous positive developments, right from the start. For one, the shortage
economy and its side effects were dispelled. The new-found competition for customers, domestically and from
imports, had salutary effects. So did the right to own private property and conduct business without any restrictions
on size, the influx of technical and cultural innovations from the outside world, the liberating of personal and
economic connections abroad; last but not least, the introduction of parliamentary democracy. Since 1997 the annual
rate of economic growth has exceeded 4 per cent. Employment has improved, inflation has eased and consumption
has been rising appreciably. Economically, Hungary has been integrating steadily into the European Union. It
became certain in the autumn of 2002 that full EU membership would follow in 2004.
If the economic recession of the 1990s and other negative effects are ascribed to the changeover from a socialist to a
democratic economic order, this may justify asking whether the advantages are proportionate to the drawbacks.
Except that deep down, the general crisis derived from the planned economy, not from the change of system. Back
in the 1970s, the increase in Hungary’s foreign debt was still financing overall growth, but in the 1980s, it would
only cover stagnation. By the early 1990s, the accumulation of debt could no longer be sustained, and a steep
recession ensued. Events show how the Hungarian socio-economic system brought about by the planned economy
was generally uncompetitive and that its structure suffered depreciation on the world market. Almost everyone
agreed on this, but society was not confronted by the full scale of the problem until the protracted transformation
supervened.
General crisis in the planned economy
Almost every country in Central and Eastern Europe underwent a grave economic crisis at the end of the 1980s and
the beginning of the 1990s, with a concomitant and partly consequent political crisis as well. The process was rooted
in a general crisis of the planned economy, which affected equilibrium, growth, structures and institutions, and
extended to the mentality and set of values, the stratification, relative incomes, development goals, and education
and motivation systems of society. This led up to a change of system, conducted at speeds and in depths that varied
from country to country and region to region. (There is no attempt here to cover what prompted the Soviet state
authorities to accept the change of system to various extents in the post-socialist and Soviet successor states, or what
role the Western powers or efforts towards national self-determination played in the changes.)
Despite initial high hopes, the changeover in the economic system precipitated a recession. This was especially deep
in most Soviet successor states and in the Balkan post-socialist countries, where shortcomings in their change of
political systems— along with political chaos, tensions and even civil warfare—  curbed or thwarted the
implementation (indeed even the introduction) of essential economic reforms.
The recession was also severe, if less drastic in what became termed as the Visegrád countries. GDP slumped not
only in Hungary and Poland, heavily indebted in the 1970s and 1980s, but also in Czechoslovakia (the Czech
Republic and Slovakia). Recession came where there had not been any reform before the change of political system
(Czechoslovakia) and where there had been many years of reform (Hungary and Poland). Nor did it make any
difference whether the economic policy-makers adopted an express ‘shock therapy’ (Poland) or gradualism
(Hungary). The recession was closely related to the collapse of Comecon and the consequent loss of export markets,
coupled with the opening up of domestic markets. However, the loss of markets did not simply pose quantitative
problems, it also embodied a comprehensive structural crisis. So the handling of the economic crisis— above all
keeping individual countries solvent, resolving the tensions in their external and domestic balances, and curbing
inflation— could not be confined simply to stabilizing measures. This handling also had to be of a modernizing
character, in the classic sociological sense of assimilating the country to the most advanced Western economic and
social organization links and formats. Without such assimilation, it would not be possible to ensure the conditions
for sustainable growth after the recession. But from that, it also follows that changing the system, developing a
market economy and creating the set of conditions for lasting growth is a time-consuming process; as it involves
major social conflicts, it only succeeds usually after setbacks and diversions, through a specific learning process .
The conditions for lasting growth and the structures to meet the new demands of a world economy can only arise
through ‘creative destruction’. Nor can the destructive, conflict-inducing side of this be avoided. Although
governments try to put it off in the hope of avoiding social tensions, this deferment only spreads the tensions and
deteriorates the external and internal balances that are damaging to the whole economy, before leading to a renewed
rise in inflation. The key, therefore, is to improve the interdependent abilities of the economy to utilize, attract and
accumulate capital. In Hungary, the Németh government’s moves to prepare for the changeover of the economic
system in 1989–90, the Kupa programme of stabilization and reform in 1991–2 (named after a finance minister in
the Antall government), and the Horn government’s 1995 Bokros package can be seen as such measures. However,
each of these programmes was followed by a slackening of effort related to, among other things, electoral politics
withpolicy-makers becoming redistributive in outlook and seeking to avoid temporary infringements of vested
interests. The Orbán government of 1998–2002 had neither the incentive nor the will to continue the process of
reform. The Medgyessy government that took power in 2002 seems to be returning to a line of reforms based on the
evaluation of financial criteria.
The legal and institutional system of a market economy
The introduction of the constituents and infrastructure of a market economy did not suddenly start in Hungary in
1990. (The earlier moves were alluded to in the West as ‘goulash communism’.) There had been constant efforts to
reform the centrally planned economy from the decision to introduce the ‘new economic mechanism’ in 1966 and its
implementation in 1968, despite some obstructions and setbacks. The last stage came in the second half of the
1980s, with the introduction of taxation reform, a two-tier banking system, and company legislation.
Hungary has introduced all the essential constituents of a European system of economic law and institutions and
these are more or less functional. There are still important reforms to be made in public finance, especially in health
and public administration. Still to be completed too are the processes of liberalization, privatization and EU legal
harmonization. The gravest problems in legal security now lie in judicial implementation, not in legislation.
The deregulation and liberalization of the early 1990s meant that economic agents could decide freely and
autonomously on almost all questions, including prices, wages, employment, investments and market cooperation.
The sphere of state-controlled pricing was tightly restricted, and even in these cases, successive administrations
relied mainly on negotiation, for instance, in the energy field. (However, that did not preclude the government in
2000 from beginning to intervene directly in the operation and pricing of the energy and pharmaceutical sectors.
There are welcome signs that the Medgyessy government wishes to break with this practice.) For the commercial
sector, the Interest-Conciliation Council formulates recommendations for pay increases, although these are not
binding. Imports and exports of products and services have been liberalized. There are hardly any tariff barriers, and
the movement of capital in or out of the country is unimpeded.
There has been a significant development in the system of economic-policy institutions over the last decade. The
independence of the National Bank of Hungary is legally guaranteed. The state budget is broken up into more-or-
less autonomous sub-systems and its deficit is financed on the market. The operation of financial institutions has
been completely transformed. Competition has developed in commercial banking and in insurance, with large
numbers of consultancy, intermediary and brokerage firms appearing. The Competition Office is in operation. There
has been a substantive reform of the pension system. On the other hand, efforts to transform the agricultural sector,
the health services and public education have achieved little.
The system of legal institutions for a market economy was built in Hungary with a speed and consistency
exceptional in this region, but accompanied by widespread debate, essentially about whether ‘excessive
liberalization’ was exacerbating economic problems that were clearly and objectively great. Postponing legislation
to impose financial transparency in government and the banking system and financial discipline in the business
sector would probably have caused less destruction, but it would have meant less ‘creation’: much smaller inward
flows of foreign capital, and less efficiency in the use of existing resources.
Meanwhile the extremely serious problems in implementing the law are slow to decrease. One reason is that the
legislative process was the driving force (probably inevitably), so that new institutions were often introduced before
their staff and the conditions for their operation were in place. For instance, supervision of business associations by
company courts was ordained at a time when there were hardly any company courts in operation. Western-type
accountancy law (i.e. giving the valuer wide scope for appraisal but heavy responsibilities as well) came into force
before there were enough trained auditors and property valuers. The upshot was a constant discrepancy between the
law and day-to-day practice.
Tax evasion became general across society. Contract infringement, value-added-tax swindles, fraudulent bankruptcy
and other abuses of the law became socially acceptable. Legal security was further reduced by uncertainties
surrounding the land registry, which only recently has been become better equipped with computers. Viktor Orbán's
centre-right government (1998-2002)especially set about evading the legal procedures for public procurement. Court
proceedings are protracted and judgements often impossible to enforce. (Where rights have been infringed, the
plaintiff cannot hope for commensurate compensation and the defendant is not concerned by the prospective
penalties.)
Corporate structure and behaviour
Excessive concentration and centralization were characteristic of production and distribution before 1989. Most of
the large enterprises had been created from artificial mergers. They practised autarky and were cushioned by a
monopoly position at home. But the number of business associations and firms began to rise steeply at the beginning
of the 1980s, when it became possible to found small businesses, and gained new impetus in 1989.
State ownership in the economy was still more than 90 per cent in 1990. By 2002, the ratio had almost been
reversed, with private ownership accounting for 85 per cent. (Sixty per cent of this is down to foreign ownership,
due to the privatization purchases, foreign greenfield investment and these investors’ greater accumulation capacity.)
A similar change has occurred in contributions to GDP. The private sector produced hardly more than a quarter of
GDP in 1990. This proportion had risen to above 90 per cent by 2002.
The number of companies in every category exploded after 1989, so that Hungary now exceeds the Western
European average in density terms (over 8 companies per 1000 inhabitants). However, many of these in Hungary
were founded simply to take advantage of tax breaks or for other reasons of necessity; these tend to behave like
working individuals rather than risk-taking ventures. On the other hand, the earlier decentralization process has been
paralleled in the last few years by a perceptible process of centralization. The number of large and medium-sized
enterprises has been rising and sectors such as food processing, commerce, banking and insurance have seen a spate
of mergers.
Privatization strategy has changed with every government and within each period of office as well. One constant
feature has been the rejection of reprivatization, as technically impractical and politically unacceptable, and free
distribution of state assets. Instead, the principle of sale at market value has been emphasized, complemented in
some cases by preferential techniques that favour a particular class of purchaser.
There has been a demonstrable effect on Hungarian enterprises resulting from their access to international networks
and from better performance through globalization. Almost all the 50 biggest multinational corporations in the world
have a Hungarian subsidiary. However, the successful ventures include many medium-sized and even some small
firms. The export orientation of Hungarian industry is clear from the fact that 60 per cent of Hungarian
manufacturing output in 2002 was exported (with 80 per cent of this going to the EU). The international integration
of Hungarian industry is reflected in the correspondence of business expectations between Hungarian and EU
manufacturing firms.
Foreign-owned companies have a stimulating effect on the economy reflected in their increasing resort to Hungarian
suppliers. This process is controlled basically by the multinationals, which tend especially to prefer tested suppliers
with competitive experience when they procure inputs in which they are more sensitive to quality. These large
foreign suppliers, however, have an incentive to transfer some production to Hungary, which contributes to
greenfield investment and later to the proportion of the client multinational’s input obtained in Hungary. Meanwhile,
opportunities are also provided for existing Hungarian firms to join the supply network at the bottom of the pyramid.
On the other hand, some business activities are now moving on from Hungary to countries with cheaper labour.
Foreign investors are exploring prospects in South-East Europe as Hungarian wages are rising sharply and as the
world economy enters a more sluggish period.
The Hungarian financial sector had a strong advantage over those of the other Visegrád countries when the
transformation came in 1990. The most important aspects of this was the introduction of a two-tier banking system
in 1987 (to replace the state-owned ‘monobank’ typical of a planned economy), the passage of legislation on
securities, and the 1990 opening of a stock exchange. There followed, mainly in the second half of the 1990s,
consolidation of the commercial banks at great expense to the budget, before they were sold mainly to foreign
investors. The international assessment of the privatized Hungarian commercial banks is good. There has been
strong competition among them, especially, of course, for the best classes of customers. This competition has
brought a strong concentration in the banking sector. Consolidation of the insurance industry in 1990–93— mainly to
remedy the acute capital shortage inherited from the planned economy— was carried out mainly by the new foreign
owners, not the state, with the costs being borne ultimately by the customers. The sector has been developing
especially fast since the appearance of voluntary and statutory pension funds and may start to play an important
investment role on the money and capital markets.
Reform of the public finances
It became increasingly clear, especially in the latter half of the 1980s, that the incongruity between the low
performance of the (planned) Hungarian economy and the country’s public spending, high even by European
standards, could not be maintained. The public-finance system was weighing too heavily on the economy. Yet no
consistent reform in public finance covering the revenue and expenditure sides has taken place since the 1989
change of system. Changes of a reforming nature were made in some important fields of public finance (after several
attempts) and some of them have subsequently been reversed. The changes brought a structure of four sub-systems.
The central budget and the earmarked state funds, which existed before, were joined by regional administrations
independent of the state administration, and for a while, by social-security governing bodies as well.
Important measures of reform have included establishment of the State Audit Office (1989) and local-government
authorities (1990), placing the social-security system on a self-governing basis (1991) and ‘renationalizing’ it
(1998), the laws on the bank of issue and the budget (1992), establishment of the State Security Issuing Bureau (later
the Centre for Handling State Debt, 1993), separation of social security from benefits of a non-insurance type and
the introduction of performance financing into the health service (1994), the law on public procurement (1995),
establishment of the Treasury (1996), radical reductions in the number of earmarked state funds (1996 and 1998),
and raising the pensionable age (1996), followed by pension reform (1997). The ‘renationalization’ of the social-
security system by the Orbán government in 1998 certainly altered a system that was operating badly, but it failed to
provide better conditions of operation. Thereafter, reforms have stalled and the role of the state has begun to
increase again. Measures that ran counter to the previous principles of public-finance reform included abolishing
higher-education fees (introduced in the Bokros package of 1995), making several social benefits a universal
entitlement again, and setting out systematically to sidestep the law on public procurement.
The performance of the economy
Not until 2000 did the GDP of the Hungarian economy exceed its level before the change of system. A long time,
but that performance was still the best by any post-socialist country. A decisive factor was the economic policy
aimed at attracting capital, mainly foreign capital, through privatization and other means. That made it possible for
the branch, corporate and product structures of production and the sales market to undergo a fundamental alteration.
Eliminating excessive uneconomical capacity in industry was a necessary process. Suffering from a reduction in
domestic and foreign demand for its products, industry also lost ground through increased competition from imports
on the home market (while in other ways, the imports it employed were improving its competitiveness). At the low
point in 1992, industrial sales were a third down on 1989. The decline in manufacturing (the key sector for economic
development) ceased in 1992–3 and gave way in 1994 to increasingly rapid expansion. The export orientation of
industry increased dramatically, so that half of industrial production is being exported and more than three-quarters
of the exports are going to the EU. Solvent domestic demand is tying down a decreasing proportion of domestic
production. These developments show that the degree of autarky in industry has declined significantly, with
concomitant increases in cooperation and participation in the international division of labour.
The growth rate of the Hungarian economy (and of industry) in recent years has tended to follow the acceleration
and deceleration of the world economy, notably that of the EU and especially that of Germany. However, the level
of integration achieved through the multinational corporations and the competitiveness that has extended to
increasingly more sectors have allowed the Hungarian economy to develop faster than the EU average, during the
upward and downward phases of the business cycle.
Agricultural output sank between 1989 and 1993 to an extent similar to industrial output, after which only a slow
increase began. The national ratio of active wage earners in the agricultural sector shrank from 13% in 1990 to 6%
today. It is clear that agriculture has been one of the big losers in the transformation in Hungary, since the sector has
attracted practically no new capital, either domestic or foreign. The agricultural economy has still not emerged from
its crisis and the conditions for lasting and balanced growth are still absent. Agriculture has hardly been touched at
all by the huge energies that privatization has generally released in every other sector. The work of establishing and
organizing the necessary market and semi-market institutions (information systems, buying, processing, selling and
servicing associations, land sales and credit institutions, systems for asserting interests, etc.) has gone much more
slowly than it should have. This is for want of effective governmental support and because the rapid emergence of
transparent, predictable market conditions conflicts with the interests of certain decisive groups.
There has been an explosive development in telecommunications and retailing, where enormous development and
modernization have taken place. The number of mobile phones in operation rose above 60 per cent in 2002, while
the 20 per cent share of retail turnover done by large shopping malls and hypermarkets was much higher than in
Germany. Liberalization has been slow to take effect in telecommunications, but in retail trading there is strong
competition among the big chains, even by international standards.
The 1990s can be divided into two distinct stages in terms of exports. In the first four years, the collapse of the
former Comecon markets and difficulties of the process of changing market directions led to a 20 per cent fall in
export volume, i.e. a slightly greater fall than in GDP. The period 1994–2000, on the other hand, brought an
extremely rapid increase of export volume, even by international standards. The average export increment of over 18
per cent a year far exceeded the rate of GDP growth. The growth of industry then slowed markedly in 2001–2, in
line with the international downturn. The foreign-trade structure of the Hungarian economy underwent radical
alteration in the 1990s, as EU relations became the decisive factor in exports and imports (although less in the latter
case, due to the energy imports from Russia).
Employment in Hungary fell continually between 1990 and 1996, by almost 30 per cent (i.e. by 1.5 million, leaving
some 4 million employees). Two-thirds of this fall took place in the first three years. After 1996, employment rose
by about 1 per cent a year until stagnation, followed by a slight decline ensued in 2002. The workforce in the
competitive sector fell sharply under market-economic conditions, while the number of those employed in the
budget-financed sector hardly changed.
The fall in employment is a good indicator of the speed of transformation. In countries where the reduction is small,
the earlier, less competitive enterprises and many of the jobs in them have survived, and the transformation process
has hardly started. Where employment has fallen rapidly and this has been accompanied by an increase in
productivity (Hungary is a good example of this) the transformation, privatization and the accompanying structural
and organizational changes have taken place faster.
Investment adjusted quite flexibly to the fall in GDP after 1990, but consumption did so only after a long delay that
translated into indebtedness. Hungary’s investment rate, having been 21.6 per cent in 1989, reached a trough of 18.9
per cent in 1993 before beginning to rise again and exceed 24 per cent in 2000. This is not a satisfactory rate by
comparison with the modernization needs of the country. The volume of investment in 1992 was about 80 per cent
of what it had been in 1989, which was not reached again until 1997. (This was about the same as the volume in
1980, due to the investment fluctuations in the 1980s.)
Dilemmas in economic policy
To simplify matters somewhat, two main opinions have been heard in recent years about the state of the Hungarian
economy before EU accession, the assumed effects of entry and the strategy that Hungary should therefore be
following.
One argument runs that it will benefit the underdeveloped Hungarian economy to join because of the supports
obtainable above all through EU membership. On the other hand, the underdevelopment means that Hungary has to
obtain as many derogations— temporary waivers of the regulations— as possible during the accession talks, because
the structural backwardness of the Hungarian economy would prevent it from competing in Europe in many fields.
Advocates of this would go so far as to slow down the accession to ensure that the transition was painless. They
would like to see some of the supports obtained before accession, to assist in preparing for entry. This approach
assigns a smaller role in transforming the Hungarian economy to internal reforms and places greater hopes on
obtaining concessions and supports from the EU.
The other view regards EU accession as a matter of vital importance. It starts from the proposition that adapting to
the world economy (which for a country Hungary’s size and in Hungary’s location in a globalizing world means
adjusting to the multinationals and the EU) is the only realistic way to develop and modernize. Advocates of this
view see structural adaptation to world-market demands and production systems as inescapable, irrespective of EU
membership. While EU membership provides extra assistance for this (political stability and financial support),
countries remaining outside will find the adaptation harder and more costly (for instance, due to the Schengen
Agreement). Those arguing this case realize that the EU is also battling to retain its world-market positions, so that
reforms involving reductions can be expected in some fields of EU and member-country activity, such as state
ownership, welfare systems and budget expenditure. Modernization of the Hungarian economy depends mainly on
continuing to improve its ability to attract and accumulate capital, in which the advantages of EU membership can
play only an auxiliary role. Those advancing this argument therefore advocate the earliest possible membership on
as equal a basis as possible.
These two opposing opinions on EU accession present some fundamental issues that have plagued Hungarian
economic policy for decades. Such dilemmas concern equilibrium and growth, whether capitalism or the state
should be the prime organizing force in the economy, whether growth should derive from market-economic reforms
or stimulation of demand, and the scale and speed at which adaptation to the world market should occur. The
debates are mainly in political and economic-philosophy forms, but behind them, of course, lie decisive economic
and power-related interests.
Experience suggests that an economic policy of postponing reforms and stimulating demand without foundation
produces not growth, but successive external balance-of-payments crises that lead to recurrent restrictive measures
and major or minor reforms. However, the unpopularity of these measures leads to a subsequent unfounded
loosening of economic policy and exacerbation of the balance-of-payments problems. Hungarian economic policy-
making at the turn of the millennium has progressed beyond stabilization. It has managed to establish the main
institutional constituents of a European market economy. Through these achievements, it has managed to spread
international confidence in the Hungarian economy. Yet economic events in 2002 show that many see chances of
expanding the room for economic manoeuvre by returning to the policy based on giving a broader role to the state,
arguing that financial criteria and reforms no longer merit the same attention. These ideas gained further currency
because parliamentary and local-government elections were held during the year. The facts demonstrate that there is
still a strong inclination in the Hungarian economy— and its still young democracy and market economy— to apply
policies that will damage the equilibrium of the economy. (Not that more developed countries are immune to this
either.) However, there has been every sign since the 2002 autumn local-government elections that the Medgyessy
government— like the earlier Antall and Horn governments at a similar stage in their terms— is intent on improving
the financial equilibrium, furthering the reform process and meeting the EU criteria.
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